Jenin and the changing status of the Palestinian Authority

By James Breen-McDaid

The Palestinian Authority (PA) began security operations in December 2024 against the Jenin brigades, a term referring to fighters from factions including Palestinian Islamic Jihad, Hamas, and Fatah, whom the PA labels as “outlaws”.[i] The PA has reportedly installed checkpoints carried out raids, and cut off water and electricity supplies during its siege of the Jenin camp.[ii] In concert with these operations, the PA made a request in mid-December during a meeting with US security officials for a $680 million package to support training of personnel and expansion of ammunition and armoured vehicles supplies.[iii] Then, in January 2025 the PA banned Al Jazeera operations in the West Bank following weeks of clashes in Jenin. The New Year’s Day order cited accusations of incitement to violence and biased coverage by the media outlet four months after a similar Israeli order was decried by the PA as a “flagrant violation” of press freedom.[iv]

The PA is already vulnerable. Mahmoud Abbas, PA President and successor to Arafat, has not held elections since the 2006 result that saw the political rise of Hamas, suspending planned elections in 2021.[v] The PA’s corruption, cuts in international aid, and the perception that it acts as a “subcontractor” of the occupation have weakened its position and its near silence regarding Gaza has further damaged its standing, highlighting its inability to provide cohesive national leadership.[vi] PA suppression of protest and aggressive responses to displays of support for political rivals have gained it no favour amongst much of the community it claims to represent.[vii] Beyond its attritional relationship with its citizens, the PA has been perceived as impotent. Rising settler violence and record land seizures by Israeli authorities have shown the PA to be a weak and ineffective security guarantor in the face of increasing Israeli expansion.[viii] Operations in Jenin should be considered in light of this context.

The logic of operations in Jenin

Security cooperation between the PA and Israel is not new and is critical to the PA’s continued existence. However, the tactics used in recent operations – including cutting off water and electric, reported indiscriminate use of live rounds on civilians, and summary detention of young men – display both willingness to employ Israeli-style tactics and a concerted effort to establish political dominance by force. Two factors help to explain this.

Firstly, as the PA seeks to be the sole legitimate representative of a future Palestinian state, if we look to Max Weber’s characteristics of the modern state then it must also be the monopoly holder on legitimate Palestinian force.[ix] The elimination of armed factions may be in pursuit this monopoly. If successful, the PA could be seen as a more reliable and stable potential Palestinian government by international actors. Similarly, in the shorter term, the assertion of more concrete control over Palestinian factions may be seen as a way to guarantee a seat at the table following the war in Gaza. The PA may think that if it can demonstrate its willingness to bring dissenting voices into step and control those elements that pursue armed resistance then it can better present itself as a reliable partner in negotiations and as a viable leading organisation in post-war governance of the Gaza Strip.

The fractious nature of the Palestinian political scene and the current lack of unity is a stumbling block to the pursuit of Palestinian sovereignty and of short-term security for ordinary Palestinians. An impotent, ineffective, or simply corrupt PA will inevitably lead Palestinians to seek security from actors such as the Jenin brigades who offer a much more visible and tangible challenge to Israel. Operations in Jenin suggest the PA wants to eliminate its competitors rather than address the roots of their rise to prominence.

Secondly, one must consider outside pressure. The PA is reliant on Israeli permission to access funds to which it is theoretically entitled. In January 2025 Israel reportedly planned to use $544 million in tax revenue it collected on behalf of the PA to pay its own debt to the state-run Israeli Electric Company.[x] The adoption of a more aggressive strategy towards armed factions may be aimed at winning favour with Israel and the US in the hope of easier access to tax revenues and greater security support, such as the $680 million package.

Whatever the motivations of the PA, this approach is unlikely to bolster its position. A more aggressive approach to its own compatriots and a more friendly one towards Israel and its allies will likely further alienate the PA from its base and fuel movements that oppose its leadership, strengthening accusations that it is a subcontractor of the occupation.[xi] These Jenin operations may be a symptom of a last-ditch bid to maintain control of the Palestinian narrative as legitimacy and power slip from the PA’s grasp.

[i] ‘Security Operations in Jenin put Spotlight on Palestinian Authority’, Reuters, 9 January 2025; ‘Palestinian Authority suppresses criticism of Jenin operation in West Bank’, Al Jazeera, 5 Jan 2025; ‘Three Palestinians killed in standoff with security forces in West Bank’, Reuters, 3 January 2025.

[ii] ‘Palestinian Authority suppresses criticism of Jenin operation in West Bank’, Al Jazeera, 5 January 2025.

[iii] ‘Exclusive: Palestinian Authority requests $680m in security assistance from US, sources say’, Middle East Eye, 6 January 2025.

[iv] ‘Palestinian Authority suspends Al Jazeera for 'incitement' as it cracks down on militant groups’, France 24, 3 January 2025; ‘Lack of Palestinian Leadership Exacerbates Post-October 7 Crisis’, Middle East Council on Global Affairs, 21 November 2024.

[v] Presidential Elections (2021) – cancelled, ECFR.

[vi] ‘The New Generation of Palestinian Armed Groups: A Paper Tiger?’, International Crisis Group, 17 April 2023.

[vii]‘Palestine (State Of) 2023’, Amnesty International; ‘Palestinians clash with Abbas' West Bank forces after Gaza hospital strike’, Reuters, 18 October 2023; ‘EXPLAINER: Why are Palestinians protesting against Abbas?’, Associated Press, 28 June 2021; ‘Palestinian security forces fire tear gas at fighter’s funeral’, Al Jazeera, 8 March 2023.

[viii] ‘Chart of the Week: Settlers have used Israel's wars as cover to build more outposts on Palestinian land’, The National, 7 January 2025;

[ix] North, Douglas C., John Joseph Wallis and Barry R. Weingast (2013). Violence and social orders : a conceptual framework for interpreting recorded human history. Cambridge Etc.: Cambridge University Press, p.17.

[x] ‘Israel to use withheld Palestinian tax income to pay electric co debt’, Reuters, 12 January 2025.

[xi] ‘The New Generation of Palestinian Armed Groups: A Paper Tiger?’, International Crisis Group, 17 April 2023.